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by Gelson Tembo, University of Zambia and
Nicholas Freeland, MASDAR International Consultants, United Kingdom
Social cash transfers (SCTs) have become
increasingly popular in Sub-Saharan Africa, because
growth-centred development policies have failed
to reduce poverty. SCTs support the consumption
of the poorest, and allow them to invest in human
and other forms of capital that reduce the
intergenerational transmission of poverty.
In Zambia, pilot SCT schemes aim to reduce extreme
poverty among the most labour-constrained of the
ultra-poor, representing some 10 per cent of the
population. This One Pager reports the relative
impact of three spatially separated pilot SCT schemes
with variations in design: Chipata (urban), Kalomo
(periurban to rural) and Kazungula (rural, remote).
Target households are characterised by high dependency
ratios and high incidences of household heads who are elderly,
orphaned, female or widowed. The Kazungula scheme has the
poorest target group: household income is about a third of that
in Chipata, and children have only half the daily number of meals
taken by their counterparts in Chipata and Kalomo.
Impact was estimated using propensity score weighting (see Hirano,
Imbens and Ridder, 2003). Principal components analysis was used
to estimate an asset wealth index, which allowed disaggregation
of the SCT impact estimates by wealth status. The results show that
the SCTs do have positive and significant effects on consumption
expenditure (for complete results see Tembo and Freeland, 2008).
The impact of SCTs on selected outcomes and disaggregated
consumption effects are presented as percentages of the levels the
outcome variables would have been if the beneficiaries had not
participated in the schemes. In Kazungula, the poorest district, the
impact on consumption is one and a half times as much as in other
districts (Figure a). The SCTs are especially effective at raising non-
food consumption. Impact on food expenditure is significant only
in the two rural districts (Figure b).
Though not a primary objective of the analysis, there is also
evidence of investment effects. The types of investment effects
differ depending on where the scheme is located and the available
opportunities. All things being equal, in Chipata, the urban pilot,
beneficiary households are 30 per cent more likely to invest in
microenterprises than they would if they did not participate
in the scheme. Such effects are absent in the two rural pilots of
Kalomo and Kazungula. Instead, beneficiary households in these
districts own three times more small livestock than they would if
they had not been beneficiaries of SCTs (not included in the figure).
School attendance rates have improved in the urban scheme
(Chipata), the only one of the three to have an educational
premium and a “soft” condition of school attendance attached
to it. There is no evidence of impact on enrolment rates in any
of the three schemes.
Impact is not homogeneous across household wealth categories.
The relatively less poor are able to accumulate assets when they
participate in the SCT programme, but the same cannot be said of
the asset poor. Such threshold effects seem to suggest that poorer
households may require higher transfer levels than their less poor
counterparts. In the rural, remote scheme of Kazungula, similar
threshold effects are evident with respect to school attendance.
In conclusion, SCTs are effective tools of basic social protection.
As with most things, however, a “one-size-fits-all” approach is
inappropriate. Expectations about impact need to be moulded
by programme design and initial conditions, and vice versa.
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